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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

be prejudicial to a substantial right of the opposing party. Anything
short of prejudice should be allowed with the court retaining the sanctions of costs and continuance.
CPLR 3042: Court vacates preclusion order upon condition that delinquent party pay $100 costs.
CPLR 3042 governs the procedure for obtaining a bill of particulars. If a request properly made under this section is not compliea with, the court is empowered by subdivision (c) to preclude
the delinquent party from giving evidence at the trial as to the items
for which the particulars were requested. Preclusion is doubtless a
severe remedy and, although the CPLR is silent as to the court's authority to vacate such an order, it is not uncommon for vacatur to
be allowed76 when it is evident that the parties would not be prejudiced thereby77 and that the noncompliance with the request for the
bill of particulars was excusable. 78 Occasionally, a situation arises
whereby the court recognizes that the noncompliance was "excusable" (or at least adequately explained) but nevertheless feels that
the delinquency cannot be completely ignored and therefore conditions the vacatur upon payment of specified costs. 70 Such a situation
was recently dealt with by the Appellate Division, First Department
in Magieri v. Saks.80 There, the court modified the vacatur of a preclusion order to the extent that it be conditioned upon the payment
of $100 in costs by the plaintiff.
The Magieri outcome is sound. If the delinquency of the party
can be adequately explained and neither party is prejudiced, vacatur
should be allowed. To hold otherwise would oppose the very purpose
upon which the bill of particulars is founded: to "give each party all
reasonable opportunity to produce his own proofs, and to meet and
sift those of his adversary."8 1 Yet, even the aforestated purpose is
founded on the omnipresent striving "to reach exact justice between
the parties"8 2 and to grant the delinquent party a vacatur with no
penalty attached would hardly seem just. The use of the vacatur made
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77 See, e.g., Groon v. Yonan, 32 Misc. 2d 518, 228 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1962).
78 See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Berger, 20 App. Div. 2d 903, 248 N.Y.S.2d 936 (2d Dep't
1964).
79 See, e.g., Mittleman v. Koffier, 248 App. Div. 889, 291 N.Y.S. 159 (2d Dep't 1936)
(mem.). It should be noted that in Mittleman the delinquent party's attorney was personally required to pay the opposing party a sum of $100.
80 33 App. Div. 2d 898, 306 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1st Dep't 1970).
81 Dwight v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y. 493, 503 (1881).
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conditional upon payment of costs avoids the severe remedy of preclusion while assuring that a request for a bill of particulars is not
lightly regarded.
CPLR 3101(a): Income tax returns deemed "material and necessary."
Guided by the test of usefulness and reason, 3 courts continue to
implement the Court of Appeals decision 4 which equated the phrase
"material and necessary" found in CPLR 3101 with the relevancy
standards utilized by the federal courts 8 5 And, the criterion for what
is disclosable remains the same irrespective of the disclosure device
employed. 6 For example, in J.R. Miller Co. v. Drew,8 7 the production of income tax returns pursuant to CPLR 312088 was required on
the ground that they were material and necessary to the preparation
of a defense.
In Miller, the plaintiff alleged that it sustained a $100,000 loss
as a result of the defendant's negligence while painting plaintiff's
clothing store. Originally, defendant sought a copy of bills, vouchers,
and statements which would indicate the purchase and resale price of
the clothing, but plaintiff had destroyed these items pursuant to corporate policy. Defendant thereupon sought, successfully, production
of plaintiff's tax return, reasoning that it would reflect the extent of
plaintiff's uninsured loss.
Previous cases ordering the production of income tax returns
have involved the issue of lost earnings.8 9 Thus, the Miller court reasoned that the same approach should be used in lost profits cases. Undoubtedly, the tax returns were material and necessary to the preparation of a defense, especially since the plaintiff had destroyed the
best evidence.
83 See, e.g., Peretz v. Blekicki, 31 App. Div. 2d 984, 298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't 1969);
Beyer v. New York Tel. Co., 61 Misc. 2d 222, 805 N.Y.SU2d 265 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1969).
84 Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 285 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.

2d 449 (1968).
85 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b): "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .
(Emphasis added.)
86 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 8101, commentary 9, at 14 (1970).
The converse is also true; a protective order under CPLR 8108 is not affected by the
device utilized. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 8105, commentary 2, at 299 (1970).
87 61 Misc. 2d 638, 506 N.YS.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1969).
88 CPLR 3120(a)(1)(i) provides that a party may demand the opportunity to "inspect,
copy, test or photograph any specifically designated documents or any things which are
in the possession, custody, or control of the party served ..
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